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I
n January 1994, the Federal Reserve Board per-
mitted a commercial bank to begin using a new
type of computer software that dynamically
reclassifies balances in its customer accounts from
transaction deposits to a type of personal-saving
deposit, the money market deposit account
(MMDA).1 This reclassification reduces the bank’s
statutory required reserves while leaving
unchanged its customers’ perceived holdings of
transaction deposits.
The use of deposit-sweeping software spread
slowly between January 1994 and April 1995, but
rapidly thereafter. Estimates of the amounts of
transaction deposits reclassified as MMDAs at all
U.S. depository institutions, prepared by the Board
of Governors’ staff, are shown in Figure 1.2 By late
1999, the amount was approximately $372 billion.
In contrast, the aggregate amount of transaction
deposits (demand plus other checkable deposits) in
the published M1 monetary aggregate, as of
December 1999, was $599.2 billion.
In this analysis, we interpret the effects of
deposit-sweeping software on bank balance sheets
to be economically equivalent to a reduction in
statutory reserve-requirement ratios. We seek to
measure the amount by which such deposit-
sweeping activity has reduced bank reserves (vault
cash and deposits at Federal Reserve Banks).
Currently, transaction deposits are subject to a 10
percent statutory reserve-requirement ratio on
amounts over the low-reserve tranche ($44.3 mil-
lion during 2000, $42.8 million during 2001),
whereas personal-saving accounts, including
MMDAs, are subject to a zero ratio.3
To be useful in policy analysis and empirical
studies, aggregate quantity data on bank reserves
must be adjusted for the effects of changes in
statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of
reserves held by banks.4 In the past, such
adjustments were straightforward because changes
in statutory reserve requirements applied simulta-
neously and uniformly to groups of depository
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O’Sullivan (1998, p. 88) identifies this bank as First Union National
Bank: “The trend started almost four years ago when First National
Bank applied to the Federal Reserve to do something that became
known as ‘the reserve sweep’.” First Union’s idea is reminiscent of
the automatic-transfer-from-savings (ATS) account of the 1970s. It
differs because transaction deposits are reclassified as MMDA de-
posits, a category first created in 1982 by the Garn–St. Germain
Act.
2 These data are updated monthly, with a one-month lag, and are avail-
able on this Bank’s Web site at<www.stls.frb.org/research/swdata.html>.
3 The Monetary Control Act of 1980 imposed Federal reserve require-
ments on net transaction deposits, which equals the sum of check-
able deposits due to individuals, partnerships, corporations (includ-
ing other depository institutions), the Treasury, state and local gov-
ernments, and government agencies, minus the sum of cash items
in process of collection and demand deposits due from other depos-
itory institutions. So far as we are aware, data on net transaction
deposits have not been published by the Federal Reserve Board
since implementation of the Monetary Control Act. The statutory
reserve requirements applicable to transaction deposits are tiered,
with a zero rate applied to the reserve-exemption amount, a 3 per-
cent rate applied to the low-reserve tranche, and since April 1992 a
10 percent rate applied to amounts that exceed the tranche. The
reserve-exemption amount and the low-reserve tranche are adjusted
each year using a formula set by law. For 1992-99, the reserve-
exemption amounts were $3.6, 3.8, 4.0, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, and 4.9
million and the low-reserve tranche amounts were $42.2, 46.8, 51.9,
54.0, 52.0, 49.3, 47.8, and 46.5 million. Prior to April 1992, the
marginal ratio applicable to transaction deposits was 12 percent.
4 A broad cross-country study illustrating the importance of such
adjustments is McCallum and Hargraves (1995).
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institutions within only a small number of broad
classes. The effective date for changes in statutory
requirements varied slightly among depositories
that report data to the Federal Reserve weekly
(larger banks), those that report quarterly (smaller
banks), and those that report annually (very small
banks). Within each group, however, the effective
date was the same for all institutions. During the
1980s, the only changes in statutory requirements
were due to the phase-in and indexation
provisions of the Monetary Control Act. During the
1990s, the reserve-requirement ratio applicable to
nonpersonal savings and time deposits was
reduced from 3 percent to zero (December 1990)
and the highest marginal ratio applicable to trans-
action deposits was reduced from 12 percent to 10
percent (April 1992).5
The economic effect of deposit-sweeping soft-
ware is unlike these previous changes. The essence
of deposit-sweeping software is that it permits
banks to change the share of their transaction
deposits that are subject to a non-zero statutory
reserve-requirement ratio (see the insert “How
Deposit-Sweeping Software Reduces Required
Reserves”). Each bank is free to decide when and
how to implement the software, subject to
constraints discussed below. In this way, in part,
banks’ effective reserve requirements are “home
brewed.” As a result, the economic effects of
deposit-sweeping software must be analyzed and
measured bank-by-bank.
Our analysis suggests that required and total
reserves in December 1999, measured by the
reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM) developed in
this article, were lower by $34.1 billion and $25.8
billion, respectively, as a result of deposit-
sweeping activity. In addition, many depository
institutions have reduced their required reserves
to such an extent that the lower requirement
places no constraint on the bank because it is less
than the amount of reserves (vault cash and
deposits at the Federal Reserve) that the bank
requires for its ordinary day-to-day business. For
these banks, the economic burden of statutory
reserve requirements has been reduced to zero.
DEPOSIT-SWEEPING SOFTWARE,
REQUIRED RESERVES, AND RAM
The effectiveness of deposit-sweeping soft-
ware hinges on the use of the MMDA. This deposit
instrument was created in 1982 by a provision in
the Garn–St. Germain Act. At that time, many
banks perceived extreme competitive pressures
from money market mutual funds. The MMDA
allowed them to offer a type of deposit that was
fully competitive with money market mutual fund
shares. The MMDA was not subject to Regulation
Q interest rate controls, and, so long as no more
than six withdrawals were made by check or pre-
authorized transfer during a month, it was not
subject to the statutory reserve requirements
applicable to transactions deposits. (If a bank per-
mitted more than six such withdrawals, the
MMDA was reservable as a transaction deposit.)
The Monetary Control Act specified three cate-
gories of deposits subject to reserve requirements:
net transaction deposits, savings deposits (person-
al and nonpersonal), and time deposits (with a
minimum maturity of seven days). The act set the
reserve-requirement ratio for personal-saving
deposits to zero, and the Board of Governors set
the ratio for nonpersonal-saving deposits to zero
in December 1990. Because MMDAs are not time
deposits and the Garn–St. Germain Act prohibited
the Federal Reserve from imposing transaction-
deposit reserve requirements, they are classified
as savings deposits for reserve-requirement pur-
poses.6
At its start, deposit-sweeping software creates
a “shadow” MMDA deposit for each customer
account. These MMDAs are not visible to the cus-
tomer, that is, the customer can make neither
deposits to nor withdrawals from the MMDA. To
depositors, it appears as if their transaction-
account deposits are unaltered; to the Federal
Reserve, it appears as if the bank’s level of reserv-
able transaction deposits has decreased sharply.
Although computer software varies, the objective
is the same: to minimize a bank’s level of reserv-
5
For banks that reported deposit data weekly to the Federal Reserve,
the reserve-requirement ratio applicable to nontransaction deposits
was reduced from 3.0 percent to 1.5 percent as of December 13,
1990, and to zero as of December 27, 1990. For banks that reported
deposit data quarterly, the ratio was reduced to zero as of January
17, 1991. The latter change applied to all banks as of April 2, 1992.
6 Banks have attempted other combinations of transaction and saving
deposits. In one case, a bank suggested that customers maintain
several MMDA accounts and simply shift all funds among the
accounts as necessary to avoid making more than six third-party
payments (or transfers to other accounts) during any given month
(12 CFR 204.133). In another, a bank reclassified transaction
deposits as seven-day large-time deposits, staggering the maturity
so as to be able to pay, each day, all checks presented (12 CFR
204.134). In these cases, the Board of Governors reclassified the
saving and large-time deposits as transaction deposits and imposed
transaction-deposit reserve requirements. See the Board of
Governors Regulation D, 12 CFR Chap. 11.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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Let us consider a hypothetical $1 billion
bank with $200 million in transaction deposits.
We focus on two constraints faced by the bank:
(i) to satisfy the Federal Reserve’s statutory
reserve requirements and (ii) to convert deposits
into currency and settle interbank debits (related
to check clearing and wire transfers) using
deposits at the Federal Reserve. Fortunately, the
assets involved—vault cash and deposits at the
Federal Reserve—do double duty.
The Bank Before Deposit-Sweeping Software.
A bank’s statutory required reserves are calculat-
ed from close-of-business data. Excluding any
special adjustments, the bank’s required reserves
as of late January 1999 would be as follows:
• 0% on the first $4.9 million of transaction
deposits (the reserve-exemption amount);
• 3% on the next $41.6 million of transaction
deposits (up to the low-reserve tranche of 
$46.5 million), equal to $1.248 million;
• 10% on the amount in excess of $46.5 mil-
lion, or $15.350 million.
Banking industry data suggest that such a
bank might choose to hold vault cash equal to
approximately 5 percent of its transaction
deposits, or $10 million. If all vault cash is
“applied” to satisfy reserve requirements, the
bank would need to maintain at least $6.598 mil-
lion on deposit at the Federal Reserve to satisfy
its statutory reserve requirement. Its balance
sheet might look like Table A (see page 55).
Payments Activity and the Reserve-
Requirement Tax. Banking-industry data used in
our analysis suggest that a typical bank, in the
absence of statutory reserve requirements, would
tend to maintain deposits at the Federal Reserve
equal to approximately 1 percent of its transac-
tion deposits (in the example, $2 million). The
data also suggest that deposit-sweeping activity
does not affect the amount of vault cash held,
relative to the sum of transaction deposits plus
the amount of deposits being reclassified as
MMDA. For the example bank, the reserve-
requirement tax is the interest foregone by main-
taining $7 million, rather than $2 million, on
deposit at the Federal Reserve.
Overnight Repurchase Agreement–Based
Deposit Sweeping. During the 1970s, many
banks began “sweeping” customer deposits into
overnight repurchase agreements (RPs). Let us
suppose that the bank in this example wishes, at
the behest of its large business customers, to
sweep half its deposits each night. To do so, it
maintains an inventory of high-quality liquid
securities, such as Treasury bills. Its balance
sheet at 3 p.m., prior to sweeping, might look
like Table B1.  At 6 p.m. after sweeping, it might
appear as Table B2.
This example includes the sale (lending) of
$5 million in the federal funds market; the bank
is assumed to retain $2 million in deposits to
service customer accounts and reduce the risk of
an overnight overdraft at the Federal Reserve. If
the bank’s customers routinely desire to engage
in overnight RPs, the bank likely will reduce its
balance at the Federal Reserve and this lending
will vanish.
1990s MMDA-Based Sweeping. Our examina-
tion of banking data suggests that MMDA-based
sweeping may reduce transaction deposits at a
typical bank by two thirds or more. If the bank in
HOW DEPOSIT-SWEEPING SOFTWARE REDUCES REQUIRED RESERVES
able transaction deposits, subject to several con-
straints. The general parameters of this optimiza-
tion problem are as follows:
• The Federal Reserve calculates a bank’s
required reserves based on a 14-day average of
the close-of-day level of its transaction
deposits.7
• Each calendar month, an unlimited number of
transfers may be made from a customer’s
transaction deposit account into the shadow
MMDA. However, only six transfers may be
made out of the shadow MMDA to the
customer’s transaction-deposit account.
• Checks presented to the bank for payment are
only debited against the customer’s transaction-
deposit account, not against the MMDA. If the
7 The computation of statutory required reserves involves two legally
defined time periods: the reserve computation period and the re-
serve maintenance period. The former are 14-day periods that end
every other Monday; the latter are 14-day periods that end every
other Wednesday. Prior to August 1998, a bank’s required reserves, to
be maintained during a reserve maintenance period, were based on
a bank’s deposits during the reserve computation period ending
2 days prior to the end of the reserve maintenance period. As of
August 1998, the required reserves have been based on deposits dur-
ing the reserve computation period ending 30 days before the end of
the reserve maintenance period. Required reserves must be satisfied
by eligible vault cash and deposits held during the maintenance peri-
od at Federal Reserve Banks. Eligible vault cash is vault cash held by
a bank during the reserve computation period ending 30 days before
the end of the maintenance period.
(Continued on p. 54)(Continued from p. 53)
our example does so, its required reserves will
decrease by more than 80 percent, to $3.298 mil-
lion ($1.248 million on the first $46.5 million of
deposits, plus $2.050 million on the next $20.5
million). Its vault cash—$10 million—is now
more than adequate to fully satisfy its new, lower
required reserves. After sweeping, its balance
sheet might look like Table C.
Although the bank no longer needs deposits
at the Federal Reserve to satisfy reserve require-
ments, we assume that the bank retains $2 mil-
lion to service customer accounts and reduce the
risk of an overnight overdraft. In a recent
banking-industry journal article, a seller of
MMDA-based sweep software says that an aggres-
sive deposit-sweeping bank can reduce its hold-
ings of reserves (vault cash and deposits at the
Federal Reserve) to less than 1 percent of its total
assets.1 If our example bank reduces slightly its
holdings of vault cash, it will attain that target.
In our example, both RP-based and MMDA-
based sweeps reduce to zero the “burden” of
statutory reserve requirements—the bank holds
no more reserves than are necessary for its day-
to-day operations. In addition, both types of
sweeps reduce the bank’s required reserves by
enough that they are fully satisfied with vault
cash. But, the two types of sweeps differ in other
aspects. Note that RP-based sweeps constrain the
bank’s balance sheet—the bank must hold an
inventory of suitable liquid securities, as collater-
al—but MMDA-based sweeps do not. Also, RP-
based sweeps typically are conducted only with
large business customers, often in amounts of
several million dollars. These customers are eco-
nomically equivalent to partners with the bank in
the RP-based sweeps and hence are likely to
receive a significant share of the earnings. In con-
trast, MMDA-based sweeps may be implemented
for most, if not all, transaction-deposit customers
and may be invisible to the customers. Finally,
MMDA-based sweeps do not directly change the
bank’s total assets, liabilities, or deposits. Rather,
like changes in statutory reserve requirements,
they allow the bank to deploy funds from non-
interest-bearing deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks into loans and other investments.
The Role of Clearing Balance Contracts. The
analysis above excludes one additional effect of
MMDA-based deposit-sweeping activity: an
increase in clearing balance contracts. A clearing
balance contract is an agreement between a bank
and the Federal Reserve wherein the bank agrees
to maintain a certain amount of deposits at the
Federal Reserve above and beyond any amount
necessary to satisfy statutory reserve require-
ments. As compensation for (and an incentive to
enter into) the contract, the bank receives earn-
ings credits from the Federal Reserve. Earnings
credits accrue at a rate slightly less than the fed-
eral funds rate and may only be used to defray
the cost of financial services, such as check clear-
ing, purchased from the Federal Reserve.
Kohn (1996, p. 48) notes that, through 1996,
the aggregate amount of clearing balance con-
tracts had tended to increase by 16 to 17 cents
for each dollar that required reserves decreased
due to deposit-sweep activity. Let us, therefore,
reconsider our example bank. Suppose that this
bank incurs an annual cost of $200,000 due to
check clearing and wire transfers through the
Federal Reserve, on behalf of customers. In our
example, MMDA-based deposit-sweeping software
reduced required reserves by more than $13 mil-
lion and freed the bank from using its remaining
$2 million at the Fed to satisfy required reserves.
If this bank were typical of Kohn’s average, it
might sign a $2 million clearing-balance contract.
This clearing-balance contract does not require
the bank to increase its deposit at the Fed beyond
the initial $2 million, nor does it infringe in any
way on the bank’s ability to use its $2 million
deposit for routine business activity. If the federal
funds rate were to be (say) 5 percent, the bank
would receive approximately $100,000 per year
in earnings credits. The deposit-sweeping soft-
ware has done double duty—it eliminated the
reserve-requirement tax and, at no cost to the
bank, reduced by one-half its payments to the
Federal Reserve for purchased services. (Tables




See O’Sullivan (1998). A bank consultant, quoted in this article,
estimates that almost all banks with over $750 million in assets
were using deposit-sweeping software at the end of 1997 versus
about 100 banks at the end of 1996. He also estimates that even-
tually bank profits likely will be increased between $1 billion and
$3 billion by deposit-sweeping activity. The quoted consultant fur-
ther suggests that most banks could reduce their vault-cash hold-
ings by 25 to 50 percent after implementing deposit-sweeping
software. To us, this seems unlikely because the deposit-sweep
activity does not change the amount of deposits that the bank’s
customers perceive themselves to hold. In fact, we find that the
impact of MMDA-based deposit-sweeping activity on vault-cash
ratios (when the estimated amount of swept deposits is included
in the denominator) at the banks in our sample is near zero.Assets * Liabilities *
Table A: A Bank with No Sweeping Activity 
Vault cash $10,000  Transaction deposits $200,000
Deposits at Federal Reserve 7,000 Savings deposits 400,000
Other assets 983,000 Time deposits 300,000
Other liabilities and capital 100,000
Total assets 1,000,000 Total liabilities 1,000,000
Memo: Required reserves 16,598
Applied vault cash 10,000
Surplus vault cash 0
Applied Federal Reserve deposits 6,598
Excess reserves (excl. vault cash) 402
Table B1: A Bank Preparing for RP-Based Sweep
Vault cash $10,000  Transaction deposits $200,000
Deposits at Federal Reserve 7,000 Savings deposits 400,000
Treasury bills 100,000 Time deposits 300,000
Other assets 883,000 Other liabilities and capital 100,000
Total assets 1,000,000 Total liabilities 1,000,000
Memo: Required reserves 16,598
Applied vault cash 10,000
Surplus vault cash 0
Excess reserves (excl. vault cash) 402
Table B2: A Bank After RP-Based Sweep
Vault cash $10,000  Transaction deposits $100,000
Deposits at Federal Reserve 2,000 Savings deposits 400,000
Treasury bills 0 Time deposits 300,000
Federal funds sold 5,000 Other liabilities and capital 100,000
Other assets 883,000
Total assets 900,000 Total liabilities 900,000
Memo: Required reserves 6,598
Applied vault cash 6,598
Surplus vault cash 3,402
Excess reserves (excl. vault cash) 2,000
Table C: A Bank After MMDA-Based Sweep
Vault cash $10,000  Transaction deposits $67,000
Deposits at Federal Reserve 2,000 Savings deposits, including MMDA 533,000
Other assets 988,000 Time deposits 300,000
Other liabilities and capital 100,000
Total assets 1,000,000 Total liabilities 1,000,00
Memo:     Required reserves 3,298
Applied vault cash 3,298 
Surplus vault cash 6,702
Excess reserves (excl. vault cash) 2,000
*As of close of business; dollar amounts are in thousands.
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amount of funds in the transaction deposit is
inadequate, a transfer must be made from the
MMDA.
• On the sixth transfer, all funds remaining in
the MMDA are moved to the transaction
deposit. (A seventh transfer would cause the
MMDA to be subject to the reserve
requirements applicable to transaction
deposits.)
Because no debits are made to customer trans-
action deposits between just before the close of
business on Friday and just before the opening of
business on Monday, some early software simply
reclassified transaction deposits as shadow MMDAs
prior to the close of business on Friday. This
reduced a bank’s weekly average level of required
reserves by 3
7 : its transaction deposit liabilities for
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, as reported to the
Federal Reserve, were zero. About ten times each
year, a Monday holiday allowed delaying the return
of funds to transaction deposits out of the MMDA
until the opening of business on Tuesday. Later
software is more sophisticated and analyzes the
receipt and payment patterns of customers.8 Of
course, regardless of the efficiency of the software,
the bank faces two additional constraints that limit
how much it can reduce its reserves. It must keep
on hand sufficient vault cash so as to be able to
redeem customer deposits into currency, and it
must maintain sufficient deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks to avoid both excessive daylight
overdrafts and overdrawing its account at the end
of the day.
To measure the effect of deposit-sweeping soft-
ware on bank reserves, we need a benchmark, or
alternative. RAM furnishes one such measure
because it was designed to measure the changes in
bank reserves caused by differences in statutory
reserve requirements—specifically, the differences
between those requirements in effect during the
current period and those for a specific benchmark,
or base, period.9 The view that deposit-sweeping
activity should be analyzed as a change in
statutory reserve requirements, and hence
included within the framework of RAM, is not uni-
versally held, however. The Board of Governors’
staff, for example, does not publish reserve aggre-
gates adjusted for the effects of deposit-sweeping
activity, apparently believing that the impact of
such activity is not to be interpreted as
economically equivalent to a change in statutory
requirements.10
In its economic aspects, deposit-sweeping soft-
ware programs of the 1990s differ distinctly from
the collateralized overnight-loan sweep programs
of the 1970s—to borrow a phrase, they are not
“your father’s Oldsmobile.” The business-oriented
sweep programs of the 1970s essentially were
overnight collateralized loans to mutual funds and
banks, initiated by depositors (see Kohn, 1994,
Chap. 9; or Stigum, 1990, Chap. 13). These loans
were made with the full participation of depositors,
who received directly the lion’s share of the invest-
ment return; the bank’s net earnings arose from
being a middleman. Although such sweeps
reduced banks’ required reserves, their primary
purpose was to simulate a legally prohibited
interest-bearing demand deposit.11
The retail-oriented deposit-sweeping activity of
the 1990s differs. First, except for competitive
market pressures, it seems unlikely that banks
have directly passed along the earnings from
deposit-sweeping activity to transaction-account
customers.12 In part, this may be due to few retail
depositors understanding the process, despite
many banks notifying customers via monthly
statement inserts (containing phrases such as
“…your deposit may be reclassified for purposes of
compliance with Federal Reserve Regulation D…”).
Banks’ answers to question 12 of the Federal
Reserve’s May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey
are illustrative. On that question, banks responded
8
O’Sullivan (1998) includes a description of one learning mecha-
nism in recent software.
9 For further discussion of RAM, see Anderson and Rasche (1999,
1996a, b) and earlier references therein.
10 Alternative measures of adjusted reserves currently are published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The measures differ with
respect to both the items included and the adjustment for changes
in reserve requirements. See, for example, the annual benchmark
release Reserves of Depository Institutions (Division of Monetary
Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
11 We emphasize the economic effects of sweep activity. From the
viewpoint of a bank manager, both RP- and MMDA-based sweeps
furnish a synthetic interest-bearing demand deposit for its cus-
tomers; see, for example, Coyle (2000). Note that MMDA-based
sweeping may be very profitable for a bank if its customers are
unaware of the practice and do not demand a share of the earn-
ings. Some analysts have estimated that profit margins may be as
high as 90 percent (O’Sullivan, 1998).
12 To test this hypothesis, we have examined scatter plots of bank
offering rates on other checkable deposits and time deposits, rela-
tive to market yields on both short- and long-term Treasury issues.
In monthly data, no change is apparent during the last decade.that even if they were permitted to pay interest on
demand deposits and if the Fed paid interest on
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, they most likely
would tier rates paid on demand deposits and that
the highest rate “would still be considerably below
the level of market interest rates.” Second, the
sweeps of the 1970s required banks to maintain a
significant amount of high-quality liquid collateral
for use in repurchase agreements with large
business customers. The retail sweeps of the 1990s
allow a bank to deploy into higher-earning assets,
as it sees fit, the funds released by reduced
required reserves. In the boxed insert “How
Deposit-Sweeping Software Reduces Required
Reserves,” for example, the bank’s earning assets
increase with no increase in total deposits or
funding costs.
Linkages among retail deposit-sweep
programs, the Depression-era prohibition of the
payment of (explicit) interest on demand deposits,
and the payment by the Fed of interest on deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks have been discussed by
Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence Meyer in
recent Congressional testimony.13 An important
issue is whether banks would reduce or eliminate
the use of deposit-sweeping software if the Federal
Reserve paid interest on reserve balances. Because
the economic effects of deposit-sweeping software
are similar to reductions in statutory reserve
requirements, in our opinion such an outcome is
unlikely. First, as noted above, it seems unlikely
that banks have passed much of the benefit from
1990s-style deposit-sweeping activity on to their
transaction-deposit customers. Second, because
newly released funds may be invested as the bank
sees fit, including in consumer and business loans,
it seems unlikely that deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks, earning interest at the federal funds rate,
would be an attractive investment. In question 10
of the May 1998 Senior Financial Officer Survey,
banks were asked whether they would dismantle
sweep programs if the Federal Reserve paid
interest on deposits. In their summary of the
survey, Board staff noted that “several” banks said
that they would, or might, dismantle sweep
programs. More than half of the respondents, how-
ever, said that interest paid at the federal funds rate
would be unattractive, relative to the higher returns
available on alternative investments. The staff
summary also notes, on page 8, that “the results
on this question seem qualitatively different from
the responses to a similar question on the May
1996 Senior Financial Officer Survey. On that
survey, two thirds of the respondents indicated that
they would dismantle their retail sweep programs
either immediately or over time if interest were
paid on Fed account balances held to meet reserve
requirements.” In our opinion, retail deposit-
sweeping software is here to stay for the same
economic reasons that cause banks to prefer




To measure the effect of deposit-sweeping
software on the amount of reserves held by banks,
we need to separate banks wherein the quantity of
reserves demanded is sensitive to changes in
reserve-requirement ratios from those in which it
is not.14 When reserve requirements are “low,” a
depository institution’s demand for reserves may
be largely, or even entirely, determined by its busi-
ness needs (converting customer deposits into cur-
rency, originating interbank wire transfers, settling
interbank check collection debits) rather than by
statutory requirements. In the United States, the
level of reserves held in the absence of statutory
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13 See Meyer (1998, 2000). Meyer’s 2000 testimony was in regard to
House Resolution 4209, a bill that would “require the payment of
interest on reserves maintained at Federal reserve [sic] banks…”
(106th Congress, 2nd Session, as reported with amendments on
October 17, 2000). The text of the bill is available on the Library of
Congress’ “Thomas” legislative Web site. Although the Federal
Reserve does not pay explicit interest on deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks, banks that enter into clearing balance contracts do
currently receive at approximately the federal funds rate “earnings
credits” on those deposits that are obligated under clearing balance
contracts. A clearing-balance contract is a contractual agreement
between a depository institution and a Federal Reserve Bank. In the
contract, the depository agrees to maintain a specific amount of
deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank above and beyond the
amount, if any, necessary to satisfy its statutory reserve require-
ment. In turn, the depository institution accrues earnings credits
which may be used to defray the cost of services purchased from
the Federal Reserve such as check clearing and wire transfers.
Earnings credits may not be converted to cash and have no cash
value except in exchange for Federal Reserves services. Penalties
apply for entering into such a contract and subsequently not hold-
ing sufficient deposits (Stevens, 1993). A bill now pending in
Congress (H.R. 4209) would eliminate earnings credits in favor of
cash interest payments.
14 Note that in this analysis the term “total reserves” includes all vault
cash held by depository institutions. In Board of Governors’ publi-
cations, however, reserves includes only the amount of vault cash
that is applied to satisfy statutory reserve requirements—any “sur-
plus” amount is excluded.58 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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reserve requirements might be very small indeed
because banks are permitted daylight overdrafts
on their deposit accounts at the Federal Reserve
Banks (Emmons, 1997; Furfine, 2000). When
statutory reserve requirements are “high,” the
amount of reserves held will be approximately
equal to its required reserves. (This statement
assumes that all base money held by depository
institutions can be used to satisfy reserve require-
ments. In the United States, member banks could
not apply vault cash to satisfy reserve require-
ments between 1917 and 1959.) Hence, measuring
RAM requires a model of banks’ demand for
reserves that includes an explicit role for statutory
requirements.
Let us denote a depository institution’s
reserve demand function as TRD( D,rr) , where D
denotes the institution’s deposit liabilities and rr
the statutory reserve-requirement ratio. Further,
omitting all tiering of reserve requirements, let us
denote its required reserves as RR( D,rr) =  rr D.
Then, when rr is relatively large,
such that statutory reserve requirements are, at the
margin, the binding constraint that determines the
amount of reserves held.15 When rr is relatively
small, we assume that
such that the bank’s business needs, rather than
statutory requirements, are the binding constraint.
In Anderson and Rasche (1996b), we introduced
the term economically nonbound to describe banks
where 
and economically bound to describe banks where
To measure RAM, we must know (or infer) the
sign of the derivative 
at all dates and for all banks in our sample. To be
specific, for an individual bank, let RR( Dt,rr0) and
RR( Dt,rrt) and  denote the period t levels of
required reserves when the statutory requirements
of a base period, 0, and of period t, respectively,
are in effect. For all cases, assume that sufficient
data on reservable liabilities during period t exist
so as to permit calculation of the quantity
RR( Dt,rr0) . Then, consider four cases:
Case 1: If rr0=rrt, that is, reserve requirements
have not changed, RAM = 0.
Case 2: If 
that is, if the business needs of the bank were the
binding constraint in both the base period 0 and
period t, then RAM = 0.
Case 3: If both
that is, if the statutory requirements were a
binding constraint on the bank in both the base
period 0 and period t, then the RAM adjustment
for period t (conditional on the choice of period 0
as the base period) is
Case 4: If 
that is, if the statutory requirements were binding
in the base period but not in period t, then to
measure RAM we must find the smallest reserve-
requirement ratio, say rr*, for which 
Then,
The above analysis is applicable to cases where the
only change in statutory reserve requirements be-
tween two periods is the reserve-requirement ratio,
rr, and data exist to calculate the counterfactual level
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15 Throughout this analysis, we assume that the response of excess
reserves at economically bound banks to changes in the statutory
reserve-requirement ratio is zero (see Anderson and Rasche,
1996b). Excess reserves at economically nonbound banks typically
are positive and an inverse function of the statutory reserve-
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of required reserves, RR( Dt,rr0) . For analysis of other
cases, see Anderson and Rasche (1999).
An empirical criterion for measuring RAM in
Case 4, for dates beginning November 1980, was
developed by Anderson and Rasche (1996b) based
on statistical analysis of a large panel dataset. That
analysis suggested that a bank was economically
bound during a reserve maintenance period if the
bank was legally bound and had more than $135
million in net transaction deposits.
Empirical Analysis
Because the design, implementation, and
operation of sweep software is idiosyncratic, our
analysis focuses on a longitudinal panel of 1231
depository institutions between January 1991 and
December 1999. A depository institution is includ-
ed in the panel if, during at least one reserve-
maintenance period, it was either economically or
legally bound. 16 Our panel is a subset of a larger
dataset containing more than 7500 depository
institutions, which, in turn, is an updated version
of the dataset used in Anderson and Rasche
(1996b). For some banks, data begin after January
1991 because the bank opened for business at that
point, was created by the merger of existing
banks, or only then began reporting data to the
Federal Reserve. For others, the data stop before
December 1999 because the bank failed, merged
with another bank, or was dropped from the
reporting panel. For each such bank, we use the
Federal Reserve’s bank structure database to trace
predecessors and successors. When a bank with
deposit-sweeping activity is acquired by another
bank, we add the amount of activity at the
acquired bank to the amount at the acquiring
bank. In all cases, we focus special attention on
those institutions where deposit-sweeping soft-
ware has reduced the level of transaction deposits
to such an extent that the level of the depository’s
required reserves is less than the amount of
reserves (vault cash and deposits at the Federal
Reserve) that the bank requires for its ordinary
day-to-day business.
RAM 1991-93
We begin by re-examining RAM from January
1991 through December 1993. Our previous meas-
ure of RAM was based on the statistical models of
Anderson and Rasche (1996b). Those results sug-
gested that economically bound banks (the only
ones included in that measure of RAM) were char-
acterized by two features: (i) a level of required
reserves that exceeded their vault cash and (ii)
having more than $135 million in net transaction
deposits. This framework allowed us to classify
banks into broad groups without tedious examina-
tion of time-series data for individual banks.
In this analysis, we revise our measure for
1991-93 for two reasons. First, because deposit-
sweeping software allows banks to home-brew
reserve requirements, our analysis for 1994-99
must necessarily be based on the examination of
data for individual banks. It is important to assess
whether this change in procedure—from using
aggregated data for groups of banks to using
individual-bank data—has any effect on measured
RAM. The 1991-93 period provides an exper-
imental control for this change in procedure.
Second, we seek to reduce the number of occur-
rences when a bank, as well as its deposits, moves
from being included in RAM to being excluded. It
seems unlikely that a bank’s responsiveness to
possible changes in a statutory reserve-
requirement ratio fluctuates very much from
period to period. Absent changes in statutory
reserve requirements (or a merger), we assume
that a typical bank switches infrequently between
economically nonbound and bound.
The most reliable indicator of a bank’s
economically bound or nonbound status is its
response to a change in statutory reserve
requirements. An economically bound bank will
reduce its holdings of reserves, following a reduc-
tion in reserve requirements, by approximately the
same amount as the decrease in its required
reserves. An economically nonbound bank will
not, although it might reduce its holdings by a
smaller amount. Between January 1991 and
December 1993, there were only two ways that the
statutory reserve-requirement ratio for a bank
could change:
• In April 1992, the Federal Reserve reduced the
statutory reserve-requirement ratio on transac-
tion deposits above the low-reserve tranche
from 12 percent to 10 percent. If a bank
reduced its deposits at Federal Reserve Banks
(relative to transaction deposits) following the
April 1992 reduction in reserve requirements
and did not begin or increase the size of a
clearing-balance contract, we classified the
16 A bank is said to be legally bound if the amount of its required
reserves exceeds the amount of vault cash that is legally permitted
to apply to satisfy its reserve requirement.bank as economically bound from January
1991 to December 1993. If the bank began or
increased the amount of a clearing balance
contract, we classified the bank as
economically nonbound from the date of that
increase through the end of December 1993.
An increase in the bank’s clearing balance con-
tract at the time of the reduction indicated that
payments activity, not statutory reserve
requirements, had been determining the level
of reserves held by the bank.
• The second change affected only banks that
acquired another bank. Federal Reserve regula-
tions permit an acquiring bank to “amortize”
over eight quarters the reserve exemption
amount and low-reserve tranche of the
acquired bank.17 For an acquirer with transac-
tion deposits greater than the low-reserve
tranche, the amortization reduces the
acquirer’s required reserves. If an acquirer did
not reduce its holdings of reserves so as to
match the reduced required reserves, we clas-
sified the bank as nonbound beginning in that
maintenance period.
Finally, we also classified a bank as
economically nonbound in a reserve-maintenance
period if it is legally nonbound (that is, if its
eligible vault cash exceeds its required reserves).
Because some banks alternate between legally
bound and nonbound, we modify this presump-
tion by judgmentally smoothing changes in status.
Figure 2 compares two measures of RAM for
1991-93. One is based on our 1996 method, and
the other on the method outlined above. The two
measures, for all practical purposes, are the same.
RAM 1994-99
Deposit-sweeping activity by banks substan-
tially complicates measuring RAM for 1994-99. To
cope, we follow a three-step procedure. First, we
identify the dates (reserve-maintenance periods)
affected by new or expanded deposit-sweeping
activity and estimate the amounts of transaction
deposits relabeled as MMDA. Second, we classify
each bank, for each reserve-maintenance period
between January 1994 and December 1999, as
economically bound or nonbound. This procedure
is similar to our revised measure for RAM during
1991-93 and relies heavily on the observed
response of the bank to changes in reserve-
requirement ratios and the effects of implement-
ing its deposit-sweeping software. Finally, we cal-
culate RAM based on the framework of Cases 1, 2,
3, and 4 introduced above.
Sweep Dates and Amounts
Our first task is to identify the dates on which
banks either began or changed their deposit-
sweeping activity. Although the date of the first
such deposit-sweep program is known (January
1994), banks are not required to notify the Federal
Reserve when a program is implemented, expand-
ed, or discontinued; nor are they required to
report the amount of deposits affected.18 To identi-
fy those dates when deposit-sweeping activity
either began or was expanded, we visually ana-
lyzed time-series data for each bank. The variables
examined were changes in the levels of transac-
tion and savings deposits, changes in the size of a
clearing-balance contract, and the ratios of vault
cash and deposits at Federal Reserve Banks to
transaction deposits.

































RAM,  1996 Method
RAM,  2000 Method
Figure 2
17 Under Federal Reserve Regulation D, when a bank acquires anoth-
er, the required reserves of the survivor are reduced by a tranche
loss adjustment. The initial value of the adjustment equals the dif-
ference, during the reserve maintenance period immediately pre-
ceding the merger, between the required reserves of the survivor
bank (computed as if the merger had been completed) and the
required reserves of the acquired bank(s). The reduction is phased
out over eight quarters: During the first quarter, the survivor’s
required reserves are reduced by seven eigths of the adjustment,
during the next quarter by three quarters of the adjustment, etc. 
18 The staff of the Board of Governors maintains a database of sweep
dates and amounts at individual banks, gleaned from deposit-report
data and interviews with staff of individual banks. This database
was not available for our research.
19 We also experimented with statistical methods, including vector
autoregressions containing transactions and savings deposits. The
identification error rates from these methods, in our opinion, were
unacceptably high.signature of deposit-sweeping activity consists of
two simultaneous changes:
• The level of transaction deposits decreases and
the level of savings deposits increases, during
the same reserve-maintenance period and by
approximately the same dollar amount, while
the bank’s level of total deposits is approx-
imately unchanged. It is important to condition
the analysis on the level of total deposits
because, in some cases, mergers of banks with
different mixtures of deposits otherwise create
false signals.
• The ratio of vault cash to reported transaction
deposits (that is, transaction deposits not
reclassified as MMDAs) increases sharply. This
most likely occurs because the amount of vault
cash held by a bank depends on its customers’
perceived amount of transaction deposits, not
the amount of reservable transaction deposits
reported by the bank to the Federal Reserve.
For each so-identified maintenance period, our
estimate of the amount of deposits affected is the
smaller of the increase in savings deposits and (the
absolute value of) the decrease in transaction
deposits. For some identified periods, however,
transaction deposits increased, savings deposits
decreased, and the ratio of vault cash to
transaction deposits fell. We interpret these
changes to indicate that deposit sweeping was dis-
continued or reduced in amount. The amount of
the change in deposit-sweeping activity is
calculated as the negative of the above
calculations, but is capped at the maximum
amount that we estimate the bank previously had
been sweeping.
Results
Overall, we observed deposit-sweeping activity
at 680 of the 1231 banks in our panel dataset.20
Due to mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations, as of
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Figure 3
20 For 671 banks, we have identified specific reserve-maintenance
periods in which we believe deposit-sweeping activity began or was
expanded. For 9 banks, deposit-sweeping activity is inferred
because they acquired other banks with deposit-sweeping activity.
Among the 671 banks, there were 425 acquisitions of banks by oth-
ers between January 1994 and December 1999. (This number
includes acquired banks that later were acquired by others among
the 671.) Bank mergers and acquisitions are handled by assuming
that the acquirer continues to sweep the same amount of deposits
as was being swept by the acquired bank.62 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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December 1999 our panel includes only 649 active
banks. Of these, we estimate that 463 banks were
operating deposit-sweeping software, affecting
$255.9 billion of transaction deposits. Figure 3A
shows estimates of the amount of deposit-
sweeping activity at our panel of banks during
1994-99. For comparison, the figure also shows
the Board of Governors staff’s estimate of the
amount of deposit-sweeping activity at all deposi-
tory institutions. As of December 1999, the Board
staff estimate is $371.8 billion. Figure 3B shows
the ratio of the two estimates. Prior to mid-1995,
the aggregate amount measured in our panel of
banks is approximately 85 to 90 percent that of the
Board staff’s; since mid-1997, our measure has
been approximately 65 to 70 percent of their total.
The difference between the amounts may be due
to one or more of three factors:
1. Deposit-Sweeping Programs at Smaller
Banks. Our panel includes only 1231 banks,
those which are relevant to measuring RAM;
the Board staff’s estimate seeks to include all
banks. For our purpose—measuring the reduc-
tion in total and required reserves due to
deposit-sweeping activity—the difference is
unlikely to be important. Our previous analy-
sis (Anderson and Rasche, 1996b) suggests that
the smaller banks omitted from our panel are
unlikely to change their holdings of reserves in
response to a change in statutory reserve-
requirement ratios.
2. Overlooked Deposit-Sweeping Programs.
Repeated re-examinations of our data suggest
that we have overlooked few, if any, banks
within our sample that are operating deposit-
sweeping programs. We have searched not
only for the implementation of deposit-sweep-
ing software but also for subsequent changes
in the level of sweep activity.
3. Inaccurate Estimates of the Amount of
Reclassified Deposits. Our estimated amounts
are the smaller of the absolute values of the
change in transaction and savings deposits,
subject to caveats explained above. As a fur-
ther check, we visually examined two ratios
for each bank: vault cash (VC) divided by
reported (reservable) transaction deposits (NT),
VC/NT, and vault cash divided by the sum of
net transaction deposits plus the estimated
amounts of deposits reclassified as MMDA
(SWP), VC/(NT+SWP). These data suggest that
our estimates of the amounts being reclassi-
fied are quite accurate. The ratio VC/NT almost
always increases sharply when deposit-sweep-
ing activity begins or expands. On these same
dates, the ratio VC/(NT+SWP) shows no such
jumps.
Figure 4 displays total transaction deposits at
the banks in our panel. The smaller series is the
amount of transaction deposits reported by our
panel of banks to the Federal Reserve, NT, and
hence subject to statutory reserve requirements.
The larger series is the sum of NT plus SWP. The
difference, of course, is deposit-sweeping activity.
E-Bound Status
We emphasize that our purpose in this analy-
sis is not to estimate either the total number of
banks using deposit-sweep software or the total
amount of deposits involved. Rather, we wish to
identify how deposit-sweeping activity at econom-
ically bound banks has reduced the quantity of
reserves held during each reserve maintenance
period during 1994-99. The concept and calcula-
tion of RAM focuses on deposits, not on banks. It
is the derived demand for reserves, arising from
the level of deposits and the characteristics of the
banks, that is of primary interest to us. Our next
step, therefore, is to classify, for each biweekly
reserve-maintenance period, a bank (and its
Transaction Deposits
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deposits) as either economically nonbound or
economically bound. To do so, we visually ana-
lyzed time-series data, for individual banks, on a
period-by-period basis from 1994-99. Similar to
1991-93, we believe that banks should not (and do
not) alternate often between bound and non-
bound status.
The most important indicator of the bank’s
bound and nonbound status is the change in its
holdings of reserves, relative to the change in its
required reserves.
• If a bank acquired another bank, did it make
use of the reduction in required reserves as
provided for by Federal Reserve regulations? If
not, then the acquiring bank is revealed to be
economically nonbound during those periods.
In most cases, such a bank is classified as eco-
nomically nonbound in all subsequent
periods.
• If a bank implemented a sweep program, did
its ratio of reserves to reported transaction
deposits (after subtracting required reserves
against the low-reserve tranche from the
numerator and the deposit-amount of the low-
reserve tranche from the denominator)
increase above 10 percent? If so, the bank is
revealed to be economically nonbound
because it holds more reserves than is
necessary to satisfy statutory reserve require-
ments. In most cases, such a bank is classified
as economically nonbound for all subsequent
periods.
• If a bank implemented a sweep program, did it
increase its required clearing-balance
contract? If so, the bank is revealed to be eco-
nomically nonbound because it voluntarily
increased its reserves above the amount neces-
sary to satisfy legal requirements. In most
cases, the bank is classified as economically
nonbound for all subsequent periods unless it
reduces or eliminates its clearing balance con-
tract.
• If a bank implemented a sweep program, did
its required reserves decrease below its vault
cash (that is, did the bank become legally non-
bound)? If so, the bank is revealed to be
economically nonbound because the amount
of vault cash necessary for its ordinary
business exceeds its required reserves. The
bank is classified as economically nonbound
for all periods in which it is legally nonbound.
In general, if a bank is reclassified to economi-
cally nonbound from economically bound, it
remains nonbound through to the end of the
sample. We observed, however, that a few banks
subsequently sharply reduced their excess
reserves and began responding to changes in
reserve requirements. Although the reasons for
such changes in behavior are unknown to us, we
reclassified these banks as economically bound
beginning at the date of the change.
Banks that neither implemented a deposit-
sweep program nor acquired another bank during
1994-99 experienced no change in their statutory
required-reserve ratio. Hence, we use different cri-
teria to classify these as economically bound or
nonbound. For most banks, their status as of
December 1993 is extended forward through
December 1999. A bank’s status might be changed
if it significantly changes its level of excess
reserves, enters into a clearing-balance contract,
or experiences a major change in its level or mix-
ture of deposits. In our sample, there are 551 such
banks; 88 of these had their classification changed
between January 1994 and December 1999.
Figure 5 shows the numbers of banks in our
panel classified as economically bound and
nonbound and the amounts of their reservable
transaction deposits. Changes in the numbers of
banks should not be over-interpreted because of
the large number of bank mergers and
acquisitions since 1995. Regardless, the figure
shows clearly that a major shift has occurred since
deposit-sweeping computer software began to
spread rapidly through the U.S. banking industry.
In late 1994, for example, deposits in our panel’s
economically bound banks totaled approximately
$500 billion, whereas deposits in economically
nonbound banks were less than $100 billion. By
late 1999, reported transaction deposits (subject to
statutory reserve requirements) in economically
bound banks totaled less than $100 billion, and
reported transaction deposits in economically
nonbound banks were approximately $250 billion.
Estimate rr*
The above analysis allows us to classify each
bank in our dataset, during each reserve-
maintenance period, as being in Case 1, 2, 3, or 4.
For those banks in Cases 1 and 2, RAM=0. For
those in Case 3, calculation of RAM is straightfor-
ward, as shown above. For banks in Case 4, it
remains to estimate rr*.64 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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We remind the reader that rr* does not equal
the marginal reserve-requirement ratio against
transaction deposits but, rather, is the smallest
(counterfactual) reserve-requirement ratio for
which
when
rr0>rrt , and rr0 and rrt are, respectively, the base
period and period t reserve-requirement ratios. In
this case, RAM t= RR( Dt,rr 0) − RR( Dt,rr*) .  An
estimate of rr* is calculated only once, for the
maintenance period before the sweep activity that
allows the bank to become economically non-
bound. This mimics in spirit the pre-1994 
Federal Reserve statutory regime in which reserve-
requirement ratios changed by specific amounts at
specific dates and then remained fixed at the new
values until the next change. RAM is calculated for
all subsequent periods in the dataset as if the
calculated value for rr* were the applicable statu-
tory ratio.
In what follows, we treat rrt and rr* as ratios of
reserves (vault cash, VC, plus deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks, RB) divided by the sum (NT +
SWP).21 Complications regarding tiering (the
reserve-exemption amount and low-reserve
tranche) are omitted because all aspects of the
statutory reserve requirement system, including
tiering, are irrelevant to Case 4 banks. To estimate
rr*, recall that the amount of reserves held by an
economically nonbound Case 4 bank is deter-
mined by its day-to-day business needs, not by
statutory reserve requirements. Hence, the amount










































21 In this analysis, “RB” refers to total deposits held by banks at
Federal Reserve Banks, including amounts held to satisfy clearing-
balance contracts (line 25, Table 1.18, Federal Reserve Bulletin,
August 2000). Note that this differs from the concept of reserve
balances published by the Board of Governors staff, which equals
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks minus the amount of clearing-
balance contracts (line 1, Table 1.12, Federal Reserve Bulletin,
August 2000). Also, “VC” includes all vault cash held by depository
institutions. In Board of Governors’ publications, total reserves
includes only the amount of vault cash that is applied to satisfy
statutory reserve requirements—any “surplus” amount is excluded.
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(NT + SWP):
Note that the opposite is true for an economically
bound Case 3 bank where, at the margin, the
amount of reserves is determined by the statutory
reserve-requirement ratio rrt: 22
These two relationships are not sufficient, how-
ever, to provide an estimator for rr*. To do so, we
impose one additional condition: We assume that
the amount of a bank’s vault cash is determined by
its day-to-day retail business needs and is not
affected by statutory reserve requirements or
deposit-sweeping activity. Conditional on this
assumption, we examine separately the ratios
VC/(NT + SWP) and RB/(NT + SWP). From these
ratios, we infer upper and lower boundaries for rr*
and, thereafter, a value for rr* itself.
We begin by comparing the reserves held by
banks before and after they implemented deposit-
sweeping software. Selection of the appropriate
“before” and “after” reserve-maintenance periods
requires some judgement. Our data suggest that
at many banks deposit-sweeping activity was
phased-in during a number of reserve-
VC RB rr NT SWP t +≥ × + () () .
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Vault Cash/(Reported Net Transaction Deposits + Sweeps)
Banks E-bound Before to E-nonbound After Sweep, Obs=458
Figure 6
22 This analysis ignores the carryover provision of Federal Reserve
accounting. That provision allows a bank’s required reserves during
a reserve maintenance period to exceed the sum of its eligible vault
cash and deposits at Federal Reserve Banks so long as the deficien-
cy is offset (made up) during the following period.maintenance periods. Also, we observed some
banks increasing their sweep activity at later dates,
often a year or more after the initial implemen-
tation.23 For each deposit-sweeping bank, we
visually searched the data to select the first
(“before”) reserve-maintenance and last (“after”)
reserve-maintenance periods affected by changes
in the intensity of deposit-sweeping activity—that
is, the period before sweep activity began and the
period during which the bank’s transaction and
savings deposits later settled down to new levels or
trends. We inferred from the ratios VC/(NT + SWP)
and RB/(NT + SWP) whether the economically
bound status of the bank was changed by
implementation of deposit-sweeping software. We
classified 458 banks that were economically bound
before implementing deposit-sweeping software as
economically nonbound after (Case 4); 155 banks
that were economically bound before as remaining
bound after (Case 3); 53 banks that were economi-
cally nonbound before as remaining nonbound
after; and 2 banks that were economically
nonbound before as bound after.24
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23 The ongoing tuning and expansion of deposit-sweep programs is
discussed in O’Sullivan (1998).
24 Note that these banks differ with respect to the number of periods
between the “before” and “after” dates, and the first and last peri-
ods in which data were reported. Twelve of the 680 identified
sweeping banks are omitted (the figures in the text sum to 668)
because data were not available for periods before and after the
implementation of their sweep programs.from economically bound to economically non-
bound provide evidence for a lower boundary for
rr*. Scatter plots and smoothed density functions
of the ratios VC/(NT + SWP) and RB/(NT + SWP)
are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively, for the
reserve-maintenance periods immediately before
and after implementation of deposit-sweeping
activity (the normal density is included for
reference).
25
• For vault cash, Figure 6, the similarity of the
“before” and “after” distributions is striking.
The means are approximately the same in
both cases—4.5 percent for the “before” distri-
bution and 4.6 percent for the “after”
distribution—and the densities have similar
dispersion. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic
fails to reject both the normality of the two dis-
tributions and their equality. For normality, the
values of the test statistics are (458)1/2 × 0.0446
= 0.954 for the “before” distribution and
(458)1/2 × 0.0241 = 0.516 for the “after” distri-
bution. For equality, the value of the statistic is
[(458 × 458)/(458+458)]1/2 ×  0.0611 = 0.925. In
all cases, the 5 percent critical value is 1.36.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS











































































Vault Cash/(Reported Net Transaction Deposits + Sweeps)
Banks E-bound Before and After Sweep, Obs=155
Figure 8
25 The densities are calculated by the RATS program KERNEL.SRC,
which computes a nonparametric estimate of the unconditional
distribution using the Epanechnikov kernel. We also have exam-
ined these ratios during the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, and 25th periods
after the intensity of sweep activity stabilized. Those densities and
scatter plots are nearly identical to the ones shown.68 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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The Jarque-Bera test also suggests normality.
Values of the statistic for the “before” and
“after” distributions, respectively, are 5.54 (p-
value 0.0628) and 4.89 (p-value 0.0866).
• For deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, Figure
7, the difference between the “before” and
“after” distributions is striking.26 The means
differ: 4.2 percent for the “before” distribution
and 1.2 percent for the “after” distribution (the
median for the “after” distribution is 0.8
percent). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic
fails to reject normality of the “before”
distribution, with a value of (458)1/2 × 0.031=
0.663. Normality of the “after” distribution is
easily rejected, with a value of  (458)1/2 × 0.173
= 3.70. (In all cases, the 5 percent critical
value is 1.36.) The Jarque-Bera statistic yields
similar results for normality, with values of
2.03 (p-value 0.363) and 5059.7 (p-value of 0).
These distributions suggest that the mean of rr*
likely is not less than 5.8 (= 4.6 + 1.2) percent.
Data for the 155 economically bound banks
that remained bound after implementing sweep
programs provide evidence in favor of an upper
boundary for rr*. Scatter plots and smoothed den-





















































































Deposits at the Federal Reserve/(Reported Net Transaction Deposits + Sweeps)
Banks E-bound Before and After Sweep, Obs=155
Figure 9
26Note that the inclusion of deposits at the Federal Reserve used to
satisfy required clearing balance contracts gives the distributions
thick right tails.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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RB/(NT + SWP) are shown in Figures 8 and 9,
respectively, for the reserve-maintenance periods
immediately before and after implementation of
deposit-sweeping activity.
• For the vault-cash ratio, the means of the
“before” and “after” distributions are equal, at
4.1 percent. Normality of the distributions is not
rejected, with Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistics equal to 1.03 and 0.980, respectively,
and equality is not rejected with a value of
0.040. (In all cases, the 5 percent critical value is
1.36.) The Jarque-Bera statistic also does not
reject normality, with values of 2.04 (p-value
0.361) and 0.719 (p-value 0.698).
• For deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, the
means of the “before” and “after” distributions
are 5.0 and 2.1 percent, respectively. Normality
of the “before” distribution is not rejected with a
statistic of 1.11, but normality of the “after” dis-
tribution is rejected with a value of 1.74.
Normality of both distributions is rejected by the
Jarque-Bera statistic, however, with values of
1752.4 (p-value 0) and 4187.2 (p-value 0).
These data suggest that the mean of rr* likely is
not more than 6.2 (= 4.1+ 2.1) percent.
These statistics suggest that, in the absence of
statutory reserve requirements, a typical bank in
our sample likely would maintain approximately a
1 percent ratio of deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks (including deposits used to satisfy clearing-
balance contracts) to total net transaction deposits
(including any amounts reclassified as MMDA).
Hence, we conclude that a reasonable estimator for
rr* for a Case 4 bank is the sum of 1 percent plus
the bank’s vault-cash ratio during the reserve-
maintenance period immediately before the period
(or sequence of periods) during which the bank
began (or changed the intensity of) its deposit-
sweeping activity. Applying this rule to our sample
of 680 identified sweeping banks, we estimate rr*
for 454 banks where, during the reserve-mainten-
ance period immediately prior to beginning sweep
activity, (i) the bank is classified as economically
bound and (ii) the level of required reserves is less
than the sum of vault cash plus 1 percent of trans-
action deposits plus sweeps:
where RR denotes the bank’s required reserves, VC
its vault cash, and SWP the estimated amount
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Figure 10percent, exactly the lower boundary discussed
above, with a standard deviation of 1.96.
As of December 1999, after numerous mer-
gers, our panel contained 649 active banks. Of
these, 269 were classified as Case 4, 199 as Case 3,
60 as Case 2, and 121 as Case 1. The mean of the
estimated rr* for the 269 banks classified as Case
4 is 5.62 percent.
RAM
To illustrate the importance of our adjustments
for deposit-sweeping activity and for banks falling
below frictional levels of reserve demand (the rr*
correction, in Case 4), four alternative RAM series
are shown in Figure 10.27
• Our preferred measure, which includes the
effects of deposit-sweeping activity and rr*, is
labeled “1. RAM, 2000 method.” This measure
suggests that bank reserves in December 1999
were lower by $25.8 billion, relative to what
might be expected in the absence of deposit-
sweeping software.
• The series labeled “2.” is the same calculation
as “1.” except that it ignores the rr* adjust-
ment. That is, it assumes for each bank that
the amount of reserves freed by deposit-
sweeping activity equals the reduction in
required reserves. Our analysis shows, howev-
er, that deposit-sweeping software often is able
to reduce a bank’s required reserves to a level
below the reserves necessary for the bank’s
day-to-day business. This measure suggests
that banks’ required reserves in December
1999 were lower by $34.1 billion, relative to
what might be expected in the absence of
such software.
• The series labeled “3.” is RAM according to the
method of Anderson and Rasche (1996b). This
series ignores deposit-sweeping activity.
• The series labeled “4.” is the same as “3.”
except that it adjusts for rr*-type behavior.
The very small difference between series “3.”
and “4.” ($1.9 billion in December 1999)
emphasizes that a correct RAM adjustment
must include the effects of interaction between
reductions in reserve requirements and banks
realizing that their required reserves have fall-
en below the amount necessary for day-to-day
business.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has examined the extraordinary
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27 These estimates differ from reserve measures published by the
Federal Reserve Board. In that data, total and required reserves
(adjusted for changes in reserve requirements and seasonal varia-
tion) both decreased from January 1994 to December 1999 by $19
billion. Note that the Board’s measure does not include “surplus”
vault cash, that is, vault cash held by depositories but not used to
satisfy reserve requirements. The Board’s measures also include an
adjustment for the effect of changes in the low-reserve tranche
between January 1995 and December 1999 of approximately $700
million (during this period, decreases in the size of the tranche
increased required reserves).
During the 1990s, Federal Reserve
publications have documented the spread of
deposit-sweeping software through the U.S.
banking industry. The July 1994 Humphrey-
Hawkins Act monetary-policy report introduced
deposit-sweep programs in a single sentence. The
July 1995 report noted that approximately $12
billion of deposits were involved in sweep activity
and, as a result, that deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks had decreased by about $1.2 billion. It also
raised concern regarding an increase in federal
funds rate volatility if deposits decreased further.
The July 1996 report included a special appendix
on the operation of sweep programs. The
February 1997 report noted that the aggregate
amount of deposits affected by sweep programs
had increased to approximately $116 billion,
compared with $45 billion in 1995. The July
1997 report noted the introduction of deposit-
sweep programs for household demand deposits
and noted that some banks were increasing the
size of their clearing balance contracts when
sweep programs reduced their required reserves.
Subsequent reports have repeated these themes,
along with an appeal that the Congress allow the
Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserve
balances (Meyer, 1998, 2000). In addition,
deposit-sweep activity also has been highlighted
in the annual reports of the Open Market Desk
(see, for example, Hilton 1999, and Bennett and
Hilton, 1997) and in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
(Edwards, 1997).
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unwinding of statutory reserve requirements in
the United States since January 1994. Based on the
statistical results in Anderson and Rasche (1996b),
we selected a panel of 1231 banks whose demand
for reserves likely is responsive to changes in
statutory reserve requirements. For these banks,
we estimate that deposit-sweeping activity has
reduced required reserves in December 1999 by
$34.1 billion. Adjusting for banks where the new
lower level of required reserves is less than the
bank’s necessary day-to-day operating balances,
we estimate that deposit-sweeping activity has
reduced total bank reserves, as of December 1999,
by $25.8 billion relative to the amount that would
have been held in the absence of such activity.
Our analysis suggests that the willingness of
bank regulators to permit use of deposit-sweeping
software has made statutory reserve requirements
a “voluntary constraint” for most banks. That is,
with adequately intelligent software, many banks
seem easily to be able to reduce their transaction
deposits by a large enough amount that the level of
their required reserves is less than the amount of
reserves that they require for day-to-day operation
of the bank. For these banks at least, the economic
burden of statutory reserve requirements is zero.
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